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This is the first part of a three-article series that examines Budd-
hist accounts of free will. The present article introduces the is-
sues and reviews earlier attempts by Frances Story,2 Walpola 
Rāhula, Luis Gómez, and David Kalupahana.3 These “early-period” 
authors advocate compatibilism between Buddhist doctrine, de-
terminism (the doctrine of universal lawful causation), and free 
will. The second article reviews later attempts by Mark Siderits,4 
Gay Watson, Joseph Goldstein, and Charles Goodman. These 
                                                          
1 Department of History, Philosophy and Political Science, Kingsborough College, CUNY. 
Email: rrepetti@kingsborough.edu . 
2 The sequence in the Abstract shows the earliest iterations of these authors’ positions. 
Although Story’s work was published in 1976, after some of the others’ works, the ma-
terial referenced here was first presented in a talk about twenty years prior to its publi-
cation in his book. 
3 Kalupahana (Buddhist). I also review the relevant discussions in Kalupahana (History; 
Ethics), both of which were published during the time frame of what I am referring to as 
the “middle-period,” although his “early-period” position remains relatively un-
changed. 
4 Siderits (Beyond) was published in the time frame of the middle-period, but I also re-
view Siderits (Buddhism; Buddhist; and Paleo-Compatibilism), although the substance 
of his main argument has not changed. 
Repetti, Early Buddhist Theories of Free Will: Compatibilism 280 
“middle-period” authors embrace either partial or full incompa-
tibilism. The third article reviews recent attempts by Nicholas F. 
Gier and Paul Kjellberg, Asaf Federman, Peter Harvey, and B. Alan 
Wallace. These “recent-period” authors divide along compatibil-
ist and incompatibilist lines. Most of the scholarly Buddhist 
works that examine free will in any depth are reviewed in this se-
ries.5 Prior to the above-mentioned early-period scholarship, 
scholars of Buddhism were relatively silent on free will. The 
Buddha’s teachings implicitly endorse a certain type of free will 
and explicitly endorse something very close to determinism, but 
attempts to articulate the implicit theory bear significant inter-
pretive risks. The purpose of this three-article series is to review 
such attempts in order to facilitate a comprehensive view of the 
present state of the discussion and its history. 
 
 
Did the Buddha Teach Free Will? 
Monks, these two slander the Tathagata. Which two? He who ex-
plains a discourse whose meaning needs to be inferred as one 
whose meaning has already been fully drawn out. And he who 
explains a discourse whose meaning has already been fully drawn 
out as one whose meaning needs to be inferred.6  
                                                          
5 Some others include T.P. Kasulis (Zen), Edward Conze (Buddhist), and Galen Strawson 
(Bounds). Kasulis and Conze only make certain remarks en passant that bear on the is-
sue; they don’t directly analyze free will. Strawson only draws upon Buddhist ideas, 
such as the idea of the non-acceptance of a permanent self, in support of his rejection 
of free will. Although I reveal my hand throughout this three-article series, I have an 
account of “a” Buddhist theory of free will of my own (Meditation) and a more general 
version of the same account that engages deeply with the Western analytic philosophi-
cal discussion of free will (Counterfactual). 
6“Neyyatha Sutta: A Meaning to be Inferred,” from the Aṅguttara Nikāya (AN) 2.25, Tha-
nissaro Bhikkhu translation. Abbreviated references to Buddhist texts are based on Pāli 
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The title of Federman’s article raises the question, “What Kind of Free 
Will Did the Buddha Teach?” This question suggests that the Buddha 
taught a certain kind of “free will.” Federman’s article attempts to sub-
stantiate that suggestion. The Tathāgata (the Buddha) never discussed 
“free will,” but he did discuss fate, chance, karma, “dependent origina-
tion” or “conditioned arising” (the thesis that all conditioned phenome-
na originate or arise in dependence upon previous conditions),7 the 
efficacy of volition, effort, choice, and action, and a host of things that 
presuppose a kind of free will. But as the sūtra quoted above suggests, ex-
plicit and implicit accounts of the Buddha’s thought are very different 
things. 
Contemporary Western philosophical positions on free will are 
almost entirely defined by their stance on the question of whether de-
terminism or indeterminism is compatible with free will,8 which poses 
the following dilemma. If determinism is true, our choices are inevitable, 
                                                                                                                                                
Text Society abbreviations of the Pāli Canon. All such referenced material is accessible 
online at Access to Insight (http://www.accesstoinsight.org/index.html). A “Sutta” (Pāli; 
“sūtra”: Sanskrit) is a discourse of the Buddha.  (While such translations and/or expla-
nations of basic terms are obvious to scholars of Buddhism, these sorts of explanations 
are intended for Western philosophers and others who might also be interested in the 
Buddhist view of free will.)  
7 In the text I qualify “phenomena” with “conditioned” because Buddhism accepts an 
unconditioned, nirvāṇa, and it is unclear whether nirvāṇa, which is typically characte-
rized only in negative terms (i.e., as the absence of various undesirable factors), is 
properly described as a phenomenon. Also, the doctrine of dependent origination allows 
that the condition for something might be simultaneous with it. For instance, nāma-
rūpa (“name and form”) is characterized as both simultaneous with the six senses and 
as a key condition for those senses. However, it is not clear that this sort of dependency 
is causal, rather than mereological dependency or some sort of subvenient/supervenient 
dependence, in which case the linearity of causation is not obviously threatened by this 
sort of simultaneous dependence. 
8 Strawson’s is an exception. He argues that free will is impossible for other reasons, 
reasons the Buddhist would reject: because choice is always influenced by one’s mental 
states and these are always influenced in turn by prior mental states, and unless an 
agent could create itself it could not escape such influences, but no one is a causa sui 
(self-causing being). See Repetti (Meditation; Counterfactual), for a Buddhist refutation 
of this argument.  
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lawful effects of causes that predate our existence, so our belief that we 
have free will—that we could have done otherwise—is illusory. But if deter-
minism is false (indeterminism), then our choices are random, no differ-
ent from coin tosses, so we cannot credibly claim they are “up to us.” 
Thus, either way, there is no free will. 
Dependent origination seems to be the same as determinism, un-
der a slightly different description. But different descriptions that pick 
out identical phenomena cannot be substituted within belief contexts. 
For instance, “Clark” and “Superman” are different descriptions of the 
same (fictional) entity. Lois Lane may have seen Superman at the scene, 
but it would be an error to conclude that she believed Clark Kent was there. 
Likewise, dependent origination and determinism might describe the 
same principles, and it is not certain that they do, but even if they do, 
they involve different descriptions. Thus, it would be risky to conclude 
that the Buddha was a determinist.9 
                                                          
9 There is an interpretive issue about the claim that the Buddha was omniscient which 
threatens to undermine the point being made in the text. One understanding of omnis-
cience implies that the Buddha’s epistemic states were marked by perfect apprehension 
of reality, and relative to this notion (of perfectly unobstructed apprehension of reali-
ty) because “belief” connotes some sort of epistemic opacity, it seems erroneous to 
attribute “beliefs” to the Buddha, as opposed to knowledge. But the point being made in 
the present case (by analogy with Lois Lane’s beliefs) turns precisely on the issue of 
how the descriptive content of a thought individuates that thought from other though-
ts about the same object that are defined by different descriptive contents. Here is the 
problem: If omniscience implies that the Buddha knows the different descriptive con-
tents of every thought and also all the cases where those different thought-descriptions 
denote identical objects, then my claim in the text—that the Buddha cannot necessarily 
be considered a determinist even if determinism and dependent origination differently 
describe the same phenomena—would be false. For if dependent origination and de-
terminism are coextensive in their denotation, then the Buddha would know that, and 
he would be a determinist. I am uncertain about the exact type of omniscience the 
Buddha was supposed to possess, but it is not identical to that of the Western form at-
tributed to an ideal God, so I am hesitant to make this sort of argument. One descrip-
tion of the Buddha’s omniscience that supports the idea that it is distinct from God’s 
omniscience is that it is not the case that the Buddha knows everything, but that he 
apprehends clearly anything he focuses his attention on. If he never focused his atten-
tion on the descriptions that constitute the doctrine of determinism, then the claim in 
the text holds. But even if the counterargument against my claim in the text is correct, 
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The Buddha explicitly discussed dependent origination, not as a 
threat to volitional freedom, but rather as an aid: to teach that volitional 
(and other) conditions that lead to mental bondage could be reversed, 
that they could lead to mental freedom. Those mental-bondage-fostering 
conditions involve the unreflective, unrestricted expression of volitional 
impulses, which is what many Westerners typically associate with free 
will: the ability to choose freely, to do whatever we want to do, to do as 
we please. The Buddha did not prize unregulated volitional expression, 
however. The Buddha valued the more general ability to regulate voli-
tions, to choose which ones to express or restrain in order to attain libera-
tion. He more likely would consider this broader ability to be what is 
meant by “free will.” And he would likely consider unrestricted volition-
al expression as a mental-bondage-fostering indulgence, propelled main-
ly by unreflective dispositions and thus better described as “unfree will.”  
In any case, the Buddhist notions of (autonomy-resembling) re-
gulated volition and (determinism-resembling) dependent origination 
are certainly compatible, because the former requires the latter, so the 
“problem” of their compatibility never arose within Buddhism. The 
Buddha did not explicitly discuss “determinism” or “free will,” nor did 
he value the conception that Westerners take to constitute free will, so 
the problem of the compatibility of determinism and free will never 
arose either. The Buddha advocated other volitional-regulation-related 
abilities, such as the ability to control attention, to be mindful, to culti-
vate dharmic10 (liberation-oriented) views, intentions, and habits, and to 
                                                                                                                                                
we are not omniscient, and we lack knowledge of this equivalence between determin-
ism and dependent origination, in which case a version of the argument applies never-
theless to what “Buddhists” believe. 
10 From “Dharma,” a complex, originally Vedic philosophical term whose meaning the 
Buddha revised. In the Vedas, the varna (caste) system posits that one’s karmic evolu-
tion determines one’s birth and thus one’s station in life, and one’s dharma (duty) as 
such. In the Bhagavad Gita, for example, the god Krishna tells the kṣatriya (warrior caste) 
Arjuna that it is his dharma to engage wholeheartedly in the massive battle before him, 
despite Arjuna’s compassionate stirrings for his potentially killed relatives, friends, and 
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reverse adharmic ones. The Buddha discussed mental freedom and 
placed it at the heart of his teaching, along with understanding of de-
pendent origination as the key to its attainment (Kalupahana Buddhist 
30). Because Buddhism is mainly concerned with dependent origination 
and mental freedom, and these concepts resemble determinism and free 
will, respectively, Buddhism has a wealth of implicit thought on free will, 
and an even greater wealth of explicit thought on these closely related 
ideas.  
The central Buddhist belief that we can rearrange conditions in a 
way that leads to mental freedom presupposes a volition-regulating type 
of free will, whereas unregulated volitional expression is a hindrance to 
liberation, not something intrinsically valuable. The Western philosoph-
ical tradition typically wishes to expand volition-expressing autonomous 
agency and defend it against the threat of determinism, but for Budd-
hists, ego-based volitional impulse must be tamed with the assistance of 
(determinism-resembling) principles of dependent origination. Thus, in 
Buddhism, (determinism-resembling) dependent origination is not a 
problem but an ally, and this in turn means that “free will” is not a philo-
sophical problem, but a practical one: how to regulate volitional impulses 
in order to achieve liberation. This is mainly why there is no “free will 
problem” within Buddhism and thus no discussion of it throughout 
Buddhist history prior to challenges from Western philosophy and 
science.  
Thus, although the Buddha believed in free-will-resembling, 
mental-freedom-oriented volitional regulation and determinism-
resembling dependent origination, whether he would have seen “free 
                                                                                                                                                
countrymen. The Buddha uses this term, capitalized, to refer to what may be characte-
rized as the way things are (from the enlightened perspective), the pattern of things, or 
the law of all phenomena. It is sometimes used somewhat loosely to refer to the Budd-
ha’s teachings, thought to be coextensive with the ultimate truth. This shift in meaning 
is didactic: the Varna system is not how things really are, not the ultimate truth. 
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will” and “determinism” as compatible is unclear. If, moreover, as Mi-
chael Barnhart claims,11 a “blissful maintenance of contradiction” is of-
ten embraced within Asian philosophy, it follows that we cannot assume 
that anyone maintaining two beliefs has a belief about their compatibili-
ty, much less an account of it. Let us name the assumption that the mere 
maintenance of two beliefs in one mind or doctrine entails a belief in 
their compatibility “Barnhart’s fallacy,” and reasoning that avoids it 
“Barnhart’s virtue.” Any account that attributes “compatibilism” (be-
tween free will and determinism)  to the Buddha risks Barnhart’s fallacy, 
and any account that attributes a view of “free will” to the Buddha also 
risks flouting the sūtra above.12  
In Western philosophy there are so many conceptions of causali-
ty, autonomy, and their relationships as to make “the” free will problem 
a misnomer. Thus, attempts to resolve “the” free will problem appear 
sophomoric. There are good reasons to think Buddhism contains a plu-
rality of views (Keown, Buddhism)—equally complex, if not more so. 
Maybe there is, as the title of Goldstein’s monograph suggests, One Dhar-
ma, but the differences in world view that divide Theravāda and 
Mahāyāna Buddhists alone are radical.13 Because both Buddhist and 
Western philosophical conceptions of free will are so complex, attempts 
to integrate them will generate difficulties greater than attempts to un-
derstand either. Thus, we must be cautious in our assertions about “what 
the Buddha taught.” 
                                                          
11 Barnhart (recent conversation). 
12 AN 2.25. 
13 Theravāda Buddhism emphasizes the earliest Pāli texts that contain original dis-
courses of the Buddha, the Buddha’s monastic rules, and philosophical explications of 
the doctrines implicit in both; these texts form what has come to be known as the Pāli 
Canon. Mahāyāna Buddhism includes variant versions of these, but places greater em-
phasis on subsequent texts, mostly in Sanskrit, that emerge later on in India beginning 
with the teachings of Nāgārjuna, an influential early Mahāyāna teacher considered by 
many Mahāyānists to be the “second Buddha” (Loy, Second). 
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I mentioned above that the early-period authors embrace a com-
patibilism between Buddhism, determinism, and free will. This does not 
mean that they commit Barnhart’s fallacy thereby. Rather, they do not 
think Buddhism is threatened by the Western philosophical problem. It 
is natural that the first Buddhist scholars to consider whether Buddhism 
is threatened by this Western philosophical dilemma would be inclined 
to defend Buddhism by embracing compatibilism, because compatibilism 
may be described, in simplified terms, as the view that there is no prob-
lem with free will and determinism or indeterminism. Perhaps the 
greater reflection on the issue afforded by time and aided by the asser-
tions of the early-period scholars partly explains why middle-period 
scholars begin to move in the other direction, toward incompatibilism.  
The same factors likely explain why recent-period scholars divide 
along compatibilist and incompatibilist lines, a division that parallels the 
one between Theravāda and Mahāyāna Buddhism. The relevant differ-
ence between them for purposes of this discussion is that because 
Theravāda Buddhism accepts a more linear version of dependent origina-
tion that more closely resembles determinism, Theravādins are likely to 
argue for compatibilism. Because Mahāyāna Buddhism embraces a more 
radical, non-linear, or holistic version of that doctrine, sometimes de-
scribed distinctly as interdependent origination, that might be compatible 
with indeterminism,14 Mahāyānists are more likely to argue for incompa-
tibilism between free will and determinism than Theravādins. Conceiva-
bly, for each doctrinally distinct kind of Buddhism, there may well be a 
distinct theory of free will. 
                                                          
14 Arguably, the version of the doctrine of dependent origination that emphasizes in-
terdependence may make things harder to predict, but it is all still conditionality at 
work. Indeed, it might count as a greater form of determinism, whereby every particle 
in the universe simultaneously causes and is caused by every other particle, and each 
such interconnection between any two particles is still linear in that particle A affects 
particle B while B affects A, each in a deterministic fashion. Adding them all together 
only magnifies the determinism. 
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As this relatively short synopsis of the issues reveals, there is no 
singular Buddhist theory of free will, just as there is no singular Western 
philosophical theory of free will. Each Buddhist account seems to cap-
ture some essential insight about free will but seems to remain inconclu-
sive or unconvincing in whole. Unsurprisingly, the same holds for the 
Western accounts of the subject. The purpose of this three-article series 
is to highlight both what is intuitive and what is problematic in these 
Buddhist accounts, to help raise the level of the discussion and connect it 
more informatively with the Western discussion and its powerful chal-
lenges, and to facilitate more comprehensive Buddhist responses to 
these challenges.  
Let us turn now to what the early-period scholars had to say, be-
ginning with the earliest, Frances Story, who first addressed the problem 
in the 1950s. 
Story: “Non-rigid” or “Soft” Determinism?  
Story (385) elucidates the key difference between karma and determin-
ism by noting that whereas causation is universal, karma is restricted to 
volitional action and its consequences: “Volition, intention, O Bhikkhus, is 
what I call Kamma”.15 Story analyzes the relationship between present 
volitional action, karmic processes and formations from the past (dispo-
sitions), future results (382-383), other categories of karmic and non-
karmic causation, and how action may involve predispositions and other 
effects of previous karma. But he insists that because there is always an 
element of volition or voluntariness in any present action, despite the po-
werful karmic dispositional loading, so to speak, the karma doctrine is 
not fatalistic (389). 
                                                          
15 AN 4.63. “Bhikkhus” are Buddhist monks; “Kamma” (Pāli) is karma (Sanskrit), voli-
tional action, its dispositional force, its effects, and/or the lawful principles of cause 
and effect that govern that force, seen to be like “seeds” that set up a chain of condi-
tions that mature into later pleasant or unpleasant ‘fruits’ for the agent of the action.  
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Apart from his rich analysis of the different ways an action can 
variably bear fruit, Story makes interesting remarks about action requiring 
intention. Rejecting the karma doctrine of the Bhagavad Gītā (that pre-
scribes action without expectation of result), Story says “there must, in 
any case, be desire for the accomplishment of the act, or the act itself 
could never be carried out” (388). This is a Humean axiom: reason with-
out motive cannot move a person into action. However, Story adds: “This 
applies to every action except those performed by the Arahant; since 
there is no ‘unchanging Atman’, no distinction can be made between the 
doer and the deed” (388). Story’s “Arahant” (Pāli; Sanskrit: arhat) is an 
enlightened being; his “Atman” (ātman) is the Indian philosophical con-
ception of an independent self or soul that Buddhism rejects in favor of a 
“no-self” doctrine that denies any integrated, enduring, substantive me-
taphysical underpinning to the aggregates of psychophysical phenome-
na that give rise to the impression of selfhood.  
Story is astute to immediately connect the issue of no-self with 
free will, for it is unclear how a non-agent can perform any action, freely 
or otherwise.16 But the idea of non-intentional enlightened action seems to 
contradict the idea of the necessity of intention for action. Story’s sug-
gestion is that because the enlightened being is not an agent separate 
from the universe, the universe intends the action, as Wallace suggests 
(67-68); but the notion of cosmic teleology is difficult to square with 
scientific understanding. Story asserts these contradictory claims, but 
does not try to reconcile them. Arguably, however, they may be recon-
ciled. Assuming that even non-dualistic action requires an initiating in-
tention, it follows that the actions of enlightened beings count as 
intentional. Because there is no separate ego in the case of enlightened 
beings, there is no ego-volition, but there is volition, for example, the 
volition to spread the Dharma. This line of reasoning is initially promis-
                                                          
16 The notion that a permanent, unchanging ātman can even act at all is equally rejected 
in Buddhism. 
289 Journal of Buddhist Ethics 
ing, but it still raises the question: Whose volition is it, if there is no 
agent? According to the Buddha’s doctrine of anātman (no-self), insubs-
tantiality or emptiness characterize not only the person, but everything, 
in which case volitions simply arise impersonally (based on the web of 
conditions in play). This is so whether a person is caught in the illusion 
of ego or not. Thus, the same question (about whose volition it is) applies 
to the enlightened and the unenlightened equally. And the answer is the 
same in both cases: the volition belongs, ultimately, to nobody, even 
though we may distinguish volitions by reference to the “persons” who 
express them, for pragmatic reasons. The only difference is that the ar-
hat knows this, but the “worldling” (puthujjana)17  does not, and takes the 
pragmatic reference to be substantive. Arhats may be said to have de-
sires, primarily for the welfare of all beings, but they have no ego-
volitions, cravings, and the like. 
Story does examine the facially problematic issue of how a non-
self can bear karma and whether or not the non-self who acts is the same 
non-self who experiences the karmic fruit. His answer is neither dis-
tinctly affirmative nor negative. He says that there is a karmic line run-
ning continuously through the series (392): although the individual is 
the result of all his previous karma, he is free in the present to perform 
actions that change his future. As he changes, he becomes, in a manner 
of speaking, someone else although there is continuity with the former 
self out of which he emerges. (“Self” here functions simply as a conve-
nient pronoun.)18  
                                                          
17 The worldling is not only the non-Buddhist (human or otherwise), but even most 
Buddhists, by virtue of the fact that they have not yet attained the first level of liberat-
ing insight that precipitates becoming a “stream entrant,” that is, one who has entered 
the stream that leads to full awakening thereafter within a maximum of seven life-
times.  
18 Presumably, Story is here trying to express in his own words the classic Theravāda 
view that over time, from life to life, a being is ‘neither (unchangingly) the same, nor 
(completely) different’ (Milindapañha 40). In other words, nothing of the person remains 
completely unchanged between any two moments, ultimately, and yet the continuity 
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Story says “We are free to select the causes which shall deter-
mine our action in the moment of choice” (392), illustrating the principle 
of dependent origination. But he adds that this “distinction is most im-
portant: it represents the whole difference between absolute determin-
ism and free-will” (394). This reasoning, however, implies a non-absolute 
determinism, a thorn in Story’s account and for those who endorse a 
version of it—Gómez, Kaluphana, Gier and Kjellberg, Federman, and Har-
vey. Because these writers embrace dependent origination and reject 
absolute determinism, perhaps this is grounds for rejecting the idea that 
dependent origination and determinism really are the same idea under 
different descriptions. The problem with this idea is that because deter-
minism is an absolute doctrine, any such qualification collapses into the 
claim that determinism is false, and thus that indeterminism is true.19 
But most of those same writers reject indeterminism, as we shall see.  
One way to resolve this is to retain the rigidity of determinism 
but identify sub-categories like karmic, psychological, or economic deter-
minism that are relatively non-rigid in that they involve many more va-
                                                                                                                                                
between any two moments in what Siderits calls the “person-series” (Beyond Compati-
bilism, passim) is significant enough so that it would be a mistake to think of the 
changes that occur between any two stages as sufficient grounds to conclude that the 
entities present in any two such moments are entirely distinct, say, the way George 
Washington and King Milinda are entirely distinct. 
19 From the perspective of most Western philosophers writing on the subject, determin-
ism is the doctrine of universal nomological (lawful) causation, and therefore by defini-
tion an absolute doctrine in that it is held to apply to all phenomena without restriction 
or exception. One could conceivably, however, accept a non-universalized version of the 
doctrine, say, such that some or most but not all phenomena are lawfully determined. 
The main reason deterministic philosophers do not embrace this possibility is that it is 
precisely what indeterminists typically claim: that even though the laws of nature ap-
ply to most (physical) phenomena, they do not apply to certain (intentional, psycholog-
ical) phenomena, such as deliberation, choice, and action, the latter exceptions of 
which are alleged to be indeterministic. This dichotomy may be false, but there is a 
straightforward sense in which the philosophically worrisome implications of a univer-
salized determinism vanish if one accepts a non-universalized version of the doctrine. 
For, on a non-universalized version of determinism, it would no longer follow logically 
that every future state of the universe, including every choice I will make, is fixed in 
advance.  
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riables than, say, chemical determinism, such that not all the variables 
that determine behavior within that domain admit of descriptions 
couched in vocabularies that operate within that domain. For instance, 
psychological determinism may involve laws that govern causal rela-
tions between mental states, described in “folk” psychological vocabu-
lary (such as “belief” and “desire”), such as the “practical syllogism” 
generalization: for all persons, desires, and beliefs, if person A desires y 
and believes that x leads to y, then, ceteris paribus (other things being 
equal), A will do x.  
But psychological determinism presumably allows that neurolog-
ical and other “lower-level” laws also apply to and influence action, that 
not all the factors required for a full explanation of why person A desires 
y are couched in folk psychological terms, and that some of these involve 
lower-level (for example, neural) phenomena described by lower-level 
vocabularies and laws. In that regard, psychological determinism isn’t ri-
gid or absolute, nor is neurological determinism, but determinism simplici-
ter is rigid and absolute, because it contains and ranges over all those 
sub-level laws and all their interactions. When an unqualified determin-
ist thinks the laws in a sub-domain such as economics are non-rigid, she 
means that unknown factors not in the vocabulary of economics are in 
play. But this non-rigidity is sub-domain-relative and/or merely epistem-
ic, in the same way that the weather is non-rigidly determined by laws 
couched in the vocabulary of meteorology, but ultimately rigidly deter-
mined nonetheless. 
Thus, the better alternative is to use the more viable pair of con-
trasting qualifications to determinism, namely, hard and soft, as these 
have been articulated within the Western analytic philosophical discus-
sion. Both involve determinism simpliciter, but “hard” just means “rules 
out free will” and “soft” just means “doesn’t rule out free will.” While 
there are other important ways of distinguishing them, we may capture 
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a core difference in meaning by attributing inevitability to hard deter-
minism and evitability to soft determinism.20 Let me explain what is 
meant by “evitability.” Although all determinists think that all events 
are determined and that whatever is determined will happen necessari-
ly, for a hard determinist this implies that all events are determined in 
such a way that nothing we can do can make any difference whatsoever 
to final outcomes; for a soft determinist there is a possibility that an out-
come may be changed by someone who is sufficiently aware of causes 
and conditions, even though the ultimate outcome is nonetheless de-
termined. Soft determinists argue that awareness of how this action leads 
to that undesirable outcome engenders causal knowledge that renders that 
undesirable outcome evitable, for that outcome may be avoided by avoid-
ing this action; this form of evitability is perfectly consistent with de-
terminism, for it is the knowledge itself that causally contributes to the 
avoidance of the undesirable outcome, even if that knowledge itself was 
deterministically caused. The obvious connection with Buddhism is that 
the Buddha taught the evitability of mental bondage and therefore 
might be labeled a soft determinist.21  
The only problem with the hard/soft distinction is that both are 
exceptionless. However, Story and his followers seem to think that al-
though determinism mostly governs the universe, little pockets of free 
will (and, implicitly, of indeterminism) somehow obtain. But because if 
even a single subatomic particle is not determined, its indeterminacy 
could influence everything else, exceptions to determinism entail inde-
terminism. So, unless they have an account that refutes this latter claim, 
Buddhists would be wise to replace “non-absolute” with “soft.”  
                                                          
20 Dennett’s Elbow Room constitutes an elaborate, highly syncretic argument in support 
of the compatibility of evitability and determinism.  
21 Harvey and Federman rest their main compatibilist conclusion on the notion that this 
(Dennett’s) point about evitability applies to Buddhism in precisely the way just men-
tioned in the text: that the Buddha taught the evitability of suffering. 
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Story thinks that absolute or “rigid” determinism undermines 
free will; because he is certain that we have free will, determinism must 
not be absolute. For Story, this involves realizing that the dependent 
origination that accounts for suffering is the same dependent origination 
that—when the process is reversed—leads to the eradication of suffering: 
“That is the whole point of Paṭicca-samuppāda, the formula of condi-
tioned arising—that it can be reversed, by repeated acts of decision. Man 
can swim against the current: if he could not, his evolution would be im-
possible.” (Story 394) The main problem with these otherwise plausible 
assertions is that they remain unanalyzed: they leave unresolved their 
possible implications, such as indeterminism. To Western philosophers, 
they smack of “libertarianism,” the view that free will and determinism 
are incompatible, but we do have free will, in which case determinism 
must be false (or, equivalently, indeterminism must be true). 
One could maintain that dependent origination is compatible 
with the future-determining dharmic choices Story thinks express our 
freedom, yielding soft determinism, but his non-absolute determinism 
invites indeterminism. The ability to “swim against the current” sug-
gests contracausality, the ability to act contrary to all the causal determi-
nants feeding into one’s behavioral system, but this also implies the 
libertarian’s indeterminism. 
Story could have simply bit the deterministic bullet and claimed 
that the voluntary element attendant even upon karmic dispositions 
that powerfully sway the moment of choice are themselves determined, 
but that would require embracing one side of the Western philosophical 
dilemma described at the outset: that of accounting for how domino-like 
effects from lawful causes that predate our existence can be considered 
free. Other Buddhist writers endorse partial determinism, so perhaps the 
Barnhart’s-virtue-exhibiting conclusion, at this point, is that Buddhism 
has mixed feelings, unanalyzed ideas, or even inconsistent ideas about 
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determinism and freedom. As we proceed with our analysis of the other 
early-period scholars, this impression will strengthen. 
Rāhula: A Qualified Compatibilism 
After explicating dependent origination and acknowledging the impor-
tance of free will in Western philosophy, Walpola Rāhula claims that the 
free will question “does not and cannot arise in Buddhist philosophy” 
(54). This claim only seems plausible, however, because he presupposes 
an inflated view of free will that entails freedom from any and all condi-
tions: 
There can be nothing absolutely free, physical or mental, as eve-
rything is interdependent and relative. If Free Will implies a will 
independent of conditions, independent of cause and effect, such 
a thing does not exist. How can a will, or anything for that mat-
ter, arise without conditions, when the whole existence is condi-
tioned and relative, and is within the law of cause and effect? (54) 
But one could claim that the problem is with this inflated version of the 
concept of free will as contracausal or acausal, where a deflated view of 
the will as involving causation works just fine. For anyone advocating 
this sort of deflationary view, Rāhula’s argument above commits a straw 
man fallacy. 
After inflating the notion of free will, Rāhula then critiques that 
exaggerated notion on the basis of dependent origination. Not only is 
this a straw man fallacy relative to deflationary accounts, but Rāhula 
himself in the next breath advances a deflationary view of free will. But 
even the attack on this straw man ignores cases in the Buddhist litera-
ture that seem to involve contracausality, perhaps the most famous be-
ing the bowl that floated upstream against the currents—just one among 
many contra-natural, supernatural, or otherwise physical-law-violating, 
paranormal or psychic phenomena that litter Buddhist doxography (Ka-
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lupahana Buddhist 21-23, 40-44, 114-115).22 It is also unprincipled for 
those who think of nirvāṇa (enlightenment, ultimate reality) as uncondi-
tioned to dismiss out of hand the notion of free will solely on the grounds 
that it entails the idea of unconditioned freedom. This line of reasoning 
would suggest that we reject Story’s enlightened beings’ actions on the 
ground that they seem to flow from the unconditioned. However, if the 
Buddha acts from within a mental state characterized as nirvāṇa, and his 
actions ensue from his will, then because nirvāṇa is unconditioned and 
his will expresses it, his will seem to be free, logically speaking. 
As suggested above, Rāhula subsequently admits the possibility of 
a conditioned, relative free will: “Will, like any other thought, is condi-
tioned. So-called ‘freedom’ itself is conditioned and relative. Such a con-
ditioned ‘Free Will’ is not denied.” (54) This deflated approach to the 
question creates an opening for a Buddhist compatibilism according to 
which a naturally-construed form of agency is compatible with depen-
dent origination. Rāhula does not develop the deflationary idea, but con-
tinues with his rejection of the inflated idea: 
Here, again, the idea of Free Will is basically connected with the 
ideas of God, Soul, justice, reward and punishment. Not only is so-called 
                                                          
22 Arguably, however, one could claim that if one accepts psychic phenomena and the 
like, that does not mean that such phenomena are not seen as arising from (determinis-
tic) conditions, but just that they are not entirely physical conditions. That is, if there 
are other dimensions of reality, such as the sort of (astral) worlds allegedly inhabited 
by devas, demons, and the like, one could conceivably hold that they are equally sub-
ject to dependent origination. Indeed, the Buddha seems to have suggested as much 
when he said that beings in heaven and hell realms are so deeply (karmically) en-
grossed in their pleasures and their pains, respectively, that they are unlikely to be 
receptive to the Dharma, and for this reason human birth is precious. But Buddhist and 
Western causality diverge here, for whereas this picture seems coherent from the 
Buddhist perspective, from the Western perspective the very notion of a non-physical 
realm violates a foundational assumption of determinism, namely, the closure of the 
physical domain: deterministic laws cannot work, cannot govern all physical phenome-
na, if there are non-physical causal elements that mysteriously inject novel causes into 
the otherwise deterministic physical causal stream. 
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free will not free, but even the very idea of Free Will is not free from 
conditions. (54-55) 
Rāhula is intuitively right about the inflated idea of free will. A 
good question for Rāhula’s analysis, however, is whether the following 
parallel claims are equally valid: “Not only is so-called nirvāṇa not free, 
but even the very idea of nirvāṇa is not free from conditions. Not only is 
the so-called unconditioned not free, but even the very idea of the un-
conditioned is not free from conditions.”  
Principles of fair reasoning suggest that opposing views be af-
forded the same dialectical apparatus as one’s own, provided there is 
nothing in the opposing views that rules out parity of reasoning. Rāhula 
does not say much more on the subject. Thus, let us turn to Gómez’s ac-
count. 
Gómez: Further Attempts at a Middle-path Position  
Luis O. Gómez opens his article with signs of Barnhart’s virtue, for he ex-
plicitly restricts his treatment of the problem to the Nikāyas (Pāli lan-
guage early record of the discourses of the Buddha),23 while 
acknowledging that Mādhyamaka and Yogācāra theories have important 
implications for the issue (81).24 More to the point of Barnhart’s virtue, 
Gómez states: 
The reader should also be forewarned of the unavoidable risk of 
discovering in Buddhist scriptures nonexisting theories and 
problems, which are often nothing but the distortions caused by 
our Western microscope. I would, therefore, like to underline the 
                                                          
23 These are the canonical texts of Theravāda Buddhism. 
24 Mādhyamaka and Yogācāra are different forms of Mahāyāna Buddhism. Yogācārins 
(followers of Yogācāra) affirm an idealist (mind-only) metaphysics, but mādhyamikas 
(followers of Madhyamaka, the middle path) neither affirm nor deny either wholly 
realist or wholly idealist metaphysics. 
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fact that we are here also concerned with speculative arguments 
that could be developed from basic Buddhist statements by impli-
cation, whether they were or were not formulated explicitly. (81; 
emphasis in original) 
Gómez begins his analysis with the dispute between followers of two 
competing ancient Indian doctrines (vāda) about the efficacy and ineffi-
cacy of kriyā (action) or karma (action, and/or the effects of action)—
kriyāvāda (or karmavāda) and akriyāvāda (or akarmavāda), respectively. 
Akriyāvādins thought all human effort was futile; I call this view “voli-
tional fatalism.” Gómez differentiates two types of kriyāvādins, one fa-
talist, one not. Both thought that karma from previous actions extending 
backward through indefinitely many previous lives influences current 
states of being and thus current actions. One interpretation of current 
action is that it is an inevitable effect of karma that lacks (what I would 
describe as) any initiating causal force of its own. Let us call this view 
“karmic fatalism” and its denial “karmic non-fatalism.”  
Karmic non-fatalists thought, in positive terms, that effort would 
help lead to liberation, whereas karmic fatalists thought, in negative 
terms, that austerities (often painful, to “burn” away the results of prior 
karma) and abstention from action would eventually end karma and lead to 
liberation. The Buddha pointed out that even this idea implies karmic 
non-fatalism, for we are able to either perform or not perform them, and 
their performance makes all the difference to whether we suffer during 
their performance (Gómez 84). The Buddhists were among many then-
prevalent kriyāvādins, Gómez argues, but were of the karmic non-fatalist 
variety. Karmic fatalism resembles hard determinism, for it suggests that 
current actions are inevitable effects of previous karma. Gómez thinks, 
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therefore, that the arguments in the Nikāyas against karmic fatalism 
would also apply to “strict determinism,”25 and he locates at least three. 
The first argument Gómez identifies (82-83) is that not all nega-
tive experiences are caused by previous karma. For example, karma does 
not cause suffering due to bile, weather, accidents, and the like.26 This is 
consistent with Story, for whom karma is restricted to volitional action. 
In other words, Gómez and Story seem to be in agreement on the idea 
that the Buddha’s teachings on karma do not entail that even all the 
non-volitional causes of one’s experiences, such as being killed in an ava-
lanche, are themselves the karmic results of one’s previous volitions, but 
rather the karmic consequences that accrue to one in the future are re-
stricted to one’s volitional behavior in the present. Gómez’s examples 
dispel the idea (sometimes erroneously associated with karmavāda) that 
every experience is totally caused by previous karma. 
The second argument is that the relationship between actions 
and their consequences is not a one-to-one relationship such as might 
obtain in simple mechanical causation, say, between the striking of a 
match and fire. As an illustration, Gómez refers to the famous compari-
son between the effects of a grain of salt dropped in the Ganges versus 
one dropped in a small cup, on the one hand, with the uncharacteristi-
cally unethical action of an otherwise saintly person and the same action 
performed by an ordinary person, on the other hand (83).  The Buddha 
says that if there were a one-to-one karmic relationship, the saintly life 
and liberation would be impossible.27 With karma the conditions are so 
much more complex than they are with the match/fire relationship 
(which is actually more complex than it seems: when the head side of a 
dry match is struck with sufficient but not excessive force against a certain 
                                                          
25 His reasoning here suggests that he would substitute “hard” for “strict.” 
26 Saṃyutta Nikāya (SN), 36.21. 
27 Aṅguttara Nikāya (AN) 3.99. 
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type of sufficiently-flint-covered surface within a relatively-oxygen-rich 
atmosphere, fire results, but not if there are excessive winds or other 
defeating conditions). Both the salt and match examples are consistent 
with “strict determinism,” however, so Gómez could have avoided con-
fusion if he distinguished non-strict and strict karma without arguing for 
a non-strict determinism. 
The third argument involves the efficacy of effort. As suggested 
earlier, Gómez argues that the Buddha refuted karmic fatalism with the 
simple observation that the ascetic feels pain upon performing austeri-
ties and no pain upon their non-performance, in which case the perfor-
mance or non-performance is what causes the pain or its absence (84).28 
Likewise, he could have argued, abstention is something one can do to al-
ter karma, and involves effort (against desire). As Gómez suggests, the 
Buddha taught that it is precisely because actions are also initiating causes 
that we can attain liberation by performing the right actions, again illu-
strating the key principle of dependent origination. 
The problem with Gómez’s argument is that (like Story) he ex-
tends the non-strict argument from karma, which is restricted to the vo-
litional, to all dependent origination and causality, where the argument 
does not make sense. He does this because he thinks that the strictness 
of dependent origination contradicts the flexibility of karma.29 To avoid 
this, he tries to work out some sort of “middle way” approach through 
this dilemma (88), and appeals to the no-self doctrine, the threats of 
                                                          
28 He may not have realized it, but this case also refutes volitional fatalism, for the as-
cetic must want to perform the austerity (albeit because he wants to attain liberation) 
in order to perform the austerity, in which case his volition to perform the austerity is 
what accounts for his performing and experiencing the austerity.  
29 He is not alone here. In his translator’s commentary to the Sivaka Sutta (SN 36.21), 
Thanissaro Bhikkhu, for instance, thinks the Buddha rejects determinism, stating “the 
Buddha’s teaching on kamma avoids determinism and opens the way for a path of 
practice focused on eliminating the causes of suffering in the here and now.”  
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eternalism and nihilism that attach respectively to asserting or denying 
the reality of anything, and the two-truths doctrine, which differentiates 
between the view of reality from the enlightened versus the everyday 
vantages (85-87). All of these complex efforts are, on analysis, misplaced; 
they are unnecessary and are less clear than his treatment of karmic fa-
talism. When the premises one offers in support of one’s conclusion are 
weaker or less plausible than the conclusion, then that amounts to a 
form of question-begging. 
All Gómez needed to do—like Story—was to acknowledge that 
karmic variability is consistent with invariable dependent origination. 
But his reasoning, particularly in the concluding section of his essay, 
suggests that for him—like so many others, Buddhists and non-Buddhists 
alike—determinism entails fatalism. His closing sentence illustrates this: 
The question is then, does the Buddhist middle way solve the 
problem, and the answer again is obvious, if by causation is 
meant “weak” conditioning, then perhaps it does solve it, but if 
total conditioning of the series is intended, then the Buddhist 
would be no better than the Ājīvika (Gómez 88). 
(The Ājīvikas were akriyāvādin fatalist followers of Makkhali Gosāla.) 
I submit that if Story, Rāhula, and Gómez understood the differ-
ences between hard and soft determinism, they would agree that the 
Buddha would reject hard determinism and would likely accept soft de-
terminism. Because the same overall perspective is endorsed by Kalupa-
hana, the same problems arise, as we shall see. 
Kalupahana: Further Complications with Qualified Compatibilism 
David Kalupahana does not directly analyze free will or say much else di-
rectly on the subject. Kalupahana states that although there “is no one 
single term in the Buddhist texts that could be considered the equivalent 
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of the term will,” there are a variety of related terms such as volition, in-
tention, purpose, desire, craving, thirst, and want (Ethics 49). In Western phi-
losophy, however, these same notions fare equally alongside will as part 
of the phenomena to be explained. After detailing those other factors, 
Kalupahana argues that volition “is the most important factor in deter-
mining whether a person is responsible or not for an action” (52). Most 
Western philosophers would agree that whatever feature of voluntary 
behavior determines responsibility is a free-will-relevant feature, and 
that volition is such a key feature for determining responsibility. Al-
though Kalupahana does not draw the inference, it would be logical, 
therefore, to equate volition with the “will” of “free will.” 
Kalupahana examines several causes of volitional actions, such as 
instincts, conscious motivations (such as feelings of attachment and de-
sire), and unconscious motivations (such as the desire to live), but con-
cludes that Buddhist moral responsibility applies only to conscious 
motivations (Buddhist 46-47). This conclusion puts Kalupahana close to 
compatibilist Western philosophers (like Hume, Locke, Frankfurt, and 
Dennett) who see morally responsible agency as compatible with causa-
tion so long as the right relationship obtains between the agent, her voli-
tions or reasons for acting, and her actions.  
With volition as key to karmic and moral responsibility, all that is 
left for Buddhist compatibilism is an account of how dependent origina-
tion and volition mesh, such as Story’s account. Kalupahana begins to 
construct such an account, stating that the Buddha’s conception of cau-
sation involved four features:  
(1) It is objectively real (tathatā); 
(2) It involves necessity (avitathatā); 
(3) It involves invariability (anaññathatā); and  
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(4) It is conditional (ida-ppaccayatā) (Buddhist 27-28; SN.12.20). 
Because causation is conditional, as in feature (4), knowledge of those 
conditional causes that lead to the desired conditional effects makes it 
possible to bring about the conditions that necessarily, as in feature (2), 
and invariably, as in feature (3), bring about freedom from the ordinary 
operations of causation that so far have led to mental bondage and suf-
fering (31-33). If he’s right about these four features, Buddhism might 
accept soft determinism. But Story (Dimensions) and Gómez (Aspects) res-
ist the second and third of these four features, as discussed above, and 
Mahāyāna Buddhists would dispute the first three of these four features, 
as Gier and Kjellberg (Buddhism), and Wallace (Buddhist), argue.  
Kalupahana sees the key insight of the Buddha’s enlightenment 
as this knowledge of dependent origination (30, 115): “Freedom from the 
normal causal process and the attainment of the state in which the su-
pernormal causal process is operative . . . is achieved as a result” (116). In 
other words, Kalupahana thinks that conscious volition is sufficient for 
moral responsibility, and that awareness of how causation operates 
opens up the possibility of the Buddhist path to a kind of freedom from 
the normal operation of causation. Although Kalupahana seems to impli-
citly accept soft determinism, because he is inconsistent about freedom 
from causation, supernormal causal operations, psychic powers, and so 
forth, he is difficult to pin down as a (soft) determinist. For instance, 
echoing the other early-period scholars, Kalupahana states: “The prin-
ciple of dependent arising (paṭiccasamuppāda) avoids both strict deter-
minism and chaotic indeterminism” (History 117). But this contradicts his 
statements (2) and (3) above.  
Consider his next remark: “Reflective awareness (anupassanā) in 
the form of constant mindfulness (sati) is the means of discovering an 
appropriate method of behavior in a world of bewildering variety, rich-
ness, and creativity” (117). Although it is not developed systematically, 
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this remark implies that the increasingly-awakened mind has the ability 
to act wisely, close to the compatibilist idea of acting “reason-
responsively.”30 He continues, “One who adopts such mindfulness is able 
gradually to develop a method of behavior that need not necessarily con-
form to a preordained conception of ‘duty’” (History 117). Kalupahana is 
highlighting flexibly responsive behavior (as opposed to rule worship), 
the ability to spontaneously do the right thing regardless of situational 
complexity. I think we could call this ability, cultivated through Buddhist 
meditation disciplines, “Dharma-responsiveness,” as it parallels and yet 
exceeds the above-mentioned notion of “reason-responsiveness.” 
Kalupahana’s remarks about dependent origination as interme-
diate between determinism and indeterminism are enigmatic. His other 
remarks only complicate matters. For instance, he says, “the principle of 
dependent arising takes into account the natural happenings in the sub-
jective as well as objective spheres . . . without admitting absolutely de-
termined psychological or physical laws that are totally independent of 
experience” (89). If there are no absolutely determined laws, however, 
determinism is false. On the other hand, he says of the Buddha, 
His doctrine had to steer clear of notions of permanent existence 
and nihilistic non-existence, strict determinism and chaotic inde-
terminism . . . . The Buddha realized that it is inconsistent to ad-
vocate an absolute, inviolable law or uniformity and then take 
refuge in its violations in order to account for the ‘unusual.’ Simi-
larly, he was not willing to consider the mental life and freedom 
                                                          
30 See Fischer (My Way) for an account of reason-responsiveness as the key to a “semi-
compatibilist” form of free will that rejects the inflated, contracausal, indeterminism-
requiring conception of autonomy as incompatible with determinism, but accepts a 
deflated form of free will whereby the agent’s ability to respond appropriately to moral 
reasons is compatible with determinism and sufficient for purposes of moral responsi-
bility.  
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as anomalies to be sacrificed on the altar of the nomological or 
the neutral. (53)  
Despite this suggestive language, Kalupahana does not unpack any ac-
count of how the intermediate position is supposed to work, except per-
haps what is hinted at in his discussion of Ājīvika fatalism. There, 
Kalupahana describes an interesting distinction between free will and 
final freedom (liberation). The Ājīvikas rejected the efficacy of the will 
but accepted the inevitability of liberation at the end of a necessitated 
process. Kalupahana describes their fatalistic view by reference to a me-
taphor attributed to the Ājīvika teacher Makkhali Gosāla,31 as “compared 
to a ball of thread thrown down from the summit of a mountain, which 
will unwind to its full length” (Kalupahana History 15), presumably by 
force of gravity alone. This image suggests inevitable movement in a cer-
tain direction. To this interesting metaphor Kalupahana adds, “No other 
condition will make any difference to its length” (15).  
The soft determinist would disagree about the irrelevance of ef-
fort as the string unwinds, claiming that some of the unwinding is the 
result of efforts (even if some effort is the result of previous non-effort-
involving causes). The idea that specific causal conditions matter to the 
chain of events distinguishes the determinist from the fatalist, who ac-
cepts only “fate” or “destiny” as an overarching cause, and the idea that 
actions are initiating causes (even if they are themselves caused) distin-
guishes the soft from the hard determinist (and accounts for the fact 
that soft determinists are evitablists, whereas hard determinists are in-
evitablists). It is surprising that Kalupahana does not argue that the ef-
forts the practitioner makes are the conditions that account for the 
particular movements of the unraveling ball of thread, even if those ef-
forts are initiated by previous conditions (such as hearing the Dharma).  
                                                          
31 Dīgha Nikāya (DN) 1.20. 
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The Buddha thought belief in fatalism threatened volitional im-
potence, i.e., paralysis of the will. For one who accepts what I have called 
“volitional fatalism” above, once the unraveling string reached a knot, it 
would stop unraveling, and ultimate liberation would be suspended in-
definitely, at least until that knotted condition was removed. By con-
trast, Dharma-responsiveness prevents all sorts of knots. This sort of 
adjustment to the Ājīvika’s string metaphor therefore aptly captures the 
sense in which the Buddha would favor a non-fatalistic or “non-rigid” 
determinism over a fatalistic or “rigid” form of determinism, although, 
again, I prefer to avoid the confusing connotations of these descriptors 
in favor of “hard” and “soft” determinism. Thus, regardless of whether 
determinism and dependent origination are identical, it seems suffi-
ciently clear that the Buddha would reject hard determinism. However, 
two questions remain unresolved: whether dependent origination is best 
described as non-rigid determinism and whether non-rigid determinism 
equates with soft determinism.  
Conclusion 
I have reviewed the bulk of early-period scholarship on Buddhism and 
free will and found it both intriguing and inconclusive, for although it 
raises interesting questions, it gives us few clear answers. I have at-
tempted to raise the level of discourse by laying bare those elements es-
sential to properly understanding what is meant by “Buddhism and free 
will” and by calling attention to important differences in explicit and 
implicit doctrine. Our review has clarified certain points and has identi-
fied others that remain unresolved. The Buddha’s entire teaching rests 
upon dependent origination. Dependent origination appears to be de-
terministic, but canonical counterexamples to determinism and physi-
calism suggest otherwise. It is possible that the Buddha may simply have 
been a Barnhart-style “compatibilist” about these contradictory ten-
sions: he may simply have blissfully maintained implicitly contradictory 
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beliefs. (Of course, the belief that he attained a state of omniscience 
counts strongly against this latter option.) Whereas hard and soft deter-
minists agree with the karmavādins that actions have effects, hard de-
terminism suggests that because there are no alternatives, actions are 
inevitable. But belief in inevitability threatens volitional paralysis, and 
because the Buddha thought a belief that threatens volitional paralysis 
should be rejected, he would have rejected hard determinism. If depen-
dent origination equates with determinism, it seems that the Buddha 
would accept soft determinism.  
The Buddha may have held that a kind of “virtually hard” but still 
soft determinism applies more to worldlings than an unqualified soft de-
terminism does, given the karmic heaviness of their volitional disposi-
tions and their mental-bondage-fostering prizing of unregulated 
volitional expression. That is, because the typical worldling is so mental-
ly bound, it may be said that he is virtually unfree, and thus that the cau-
sation of his behavior ostensibly resembles that of the hard determined 
(unless and until he begins to cultivate some volitional regulation and 
some mental freedom). Because that possibility is always present for be-
ings “blessed with human birth,” they are only virtually hard determined, 
given the real possibility of reversing their conditions. By analogy, they 
are akin to prisoners in a cell that is periodically (quietly) unlocked elec-
tronically, not knowing that the visibly closed but unlocked door con-
tains the possibility of freedom. Thus, the Buddha may have held  that 
soft determinism applies more straightforwardly to serious or advanced 
Buddhist practitioners, especially as their practice deepens, in light of 
their intimate familiarity with the evitability principles of dependent 
origination and thus their mental-freedom-fostering prizing of volitional 
regulation—by analogy, their awareness of when and how the door is 
locked and unlocked. In addition, he may have held that enlightened be-
ings are not even properly described as soft determined because there is 
no separation between them and deterministic reality; they are free be-
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cause no volitions or actions are truly attributable to them as separate 
agents that could render them unfree.32 By analogy with the idea of vir-
tual hard determinism, this might be described as a determinism-
consistent “virtual indeterminist” position. Nonetheless, both qualifica-
tions—virtually hard and virtually indeterminist—remain qualifications 
to, and thus forms of, soft determinism. Whether soft determinism is co-
gent is another matter, taken up elsewhere.33 
The main unresolved doxographical issues are whether depen-
dent origination should be characterized as soft determinism or as some 
mysteriously hybrid non-rigid determinism, whether it applies to en-
lightened beings, and whether the no-self doctrine implies there is no 
agency and thus no free will. If, in the final analysis, the Buddha was 
simply a Barnhart-style compatibilist who held contradictory views, 
these doxographical issues may remain unresolved. Even if we could re-
solve them, the alethic questions would remain long after we resolved 
the doxographical ones. In the subsequent articles in this three-article 
series, I trace the further evolution of these issues through the middle-
period scholarship, which leans heavily toward incompatibilism, and the 
                                                          
32 Lest I give the impression that I am claiming that enlightened beings lack volitions 
(something I would deny), let me clarify the claims just made in the text. It is not that 
an enlightened person is seen as without volitions, but rather that her volitions are not 
the product of a separate ego. That is, an enlightened being has volitions but is free of 
ego-volitions (volitions influenced by spiritual ignorance). Further, it is not obvious 
that their volitions are just passively shaped by surrounding conditions, although Wal-
lace seems to suggest as much when he describes enlightened behavior as exhibiting a 
“kind of freedom” such that “one nonconceptually rests in this timeless, pristine 
awareness, allowing actions to arise spontaneously and effortlessly, aroused by the in-
terplay of one’s own wisdom and the needs of sentient beings from moment to mo-
ment.” (67-68). It seems perfectly consistent with the Buddha’s teachings that 
enlightened beings may have non-egocentric volitions that are all Dharma-responsive, 
such that they naturally respond only in wholesome ways to surrounding conditions, 
rather than in ways that are influenced by ingrained delusion and self-centeredness. 
Volitions connected with compassion, just to mention one type, appear to be both most 
natural for enlightened beings and quite consistent with anātman or non-ego. 
33 I argue that it is cogent (Meditation), but I also argue that the same model may be 
held, with minor modifications, even if indeterminism is true (Counterfactual). 
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recent-period scholarship, which (ironically) presents a forking path of 
possibilities, one compatibilist and one incompatibilist, not unlike the 
metaphorical forking path of possibilities that captures the impression 
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